This is a new post of May 5th, as promised.
I can't say this 'Falklands Diary' project working very well, in terms of eliciting comments! Plenty of people seem to be reading it, but many report problems leaving comments. Are Blogger and Blogspot defective tools? I am such a tyro I can't tell. Perhaps as a second line of communication, anyone who wants to communicate with me directly can do so on peter.harper@cat.org.uk.

Oh well, I must get on. For the original entry I posted a facsimile of the original diary, mainly to show it was genuine and that I was transcribing faithfully. I assume readers did not bother reading this, but went straight to my transcript. Perhaps the facsimiles are not really necessary, so this time I will simply present the transcript, in italics, followed by notes composed 30 years later, indicated in {curly brackets} as before. [Square brackets] are used for clarifications in the text. The next entry in my occasional 1982 diary is May 5th.

Perhaps I should make a remark before it begins. It is widely noted that the sinking of the Argentinian Cruiser General Belgrano marked a change in pretty everyone's perception of the conflict. This entry records my own reactions to that event, reported in the UK media on 3rd May 1982, and then somewhat different reactions to the sinking of HMS Sheffield, the first British ship to be lost, reported on 4th May. It's as if there are two separate diary entries, but they all occur under May 5, 1982.


May 5 -- comments on the Falklands Crisis (sinking of cruiser Belgrano & HMS Sheffield just reported). {1}


In the few days before the Belgrano was sunk I continued to be very fascinated by the affair. It continued to seem like an elaborate war game. The British use of "minimum force" seemed to be working extremely well. There was a sense of surgical efficiency, scrupulous legality, and that peculiar air of invincibility that the Israelis seemed to have before the canal crossing of 1973 {2}. It seemed that the Argentines were avoiding the TEZ {3} both by sea and air, and that little action could be expected after the bombing of the runways on the Falklands {4}. I remember faint stirrings of, if not exactly patriotism, then at least quiet pride at the professionalism and scrupulousness of "our boys".


The Belgrano changed all that. Since it was sunk outside the TEZ it struck me as wantonly bellicose. Surely a proper declaration of war is required before attacking a ship in international waters? As of today it looks as if several hundred sailors have died, & that is already far too high a price to pay for the administrative status of the Falkland Islanders. And for the various principles? What is an appropriate price for them?


This incident changed my attitude to the government's policy, & I started to have grave reservations about the task force operation. Can it be justified to continue[,] with the amount of killing this presages?  An image of the all-powerful British Navy against an outdated scratch fleet, manned by dedicated but ill-trained and ill-equipped sailors, haunted my mind. That somehow it just wasn't fair. {5}


At this point Britain had not lost a single man, while Argentina had lost a submarine, a cruiser, a naval tugboat, two Daggers (a Canberra?){6} & an unknown number of Pucaras {7} and other grounded aircraft during the bombing raids -- not to mention the frigate and helicopter damaged during the original invasion of the Falklands and South Georgia.


But now a [British] destroyer has been sunk {8} and a Harrier {9} shot down. The image of invincibility crumbles. Curiously, the attack on the Belgrano looks suddenly justified. The Argentines start to look dangerous -- 'worthy opponents' {10}. Arrogance -- never far below the surface in the press and parliament -- looks out of place (recall the Sun joke about the marine and the Argentine soldiers){11}.
(The Sheffield sinking is reminiscent of the Hood -- a single lucky shot getting to a vulnerable part {12}. I wonder if this really was the case) {13}[brackets in original MS]
-------------------- {14}
Good article by Peter Jenkins in the Guardian May 5 -- seems to have similar attitudes to mine. However I must say that I still have a great interest in the football-match-type aspects of physical fighting. I expect an eventual (re)invasion and a part of me looks forward to it. But inevitably more people are going to get killed than the total number of islanders, who in any case were in no physical danger from Argentine rule (quite the contrary -- the British in Argentina, part of the ruling elite, do very well thank you under a right-wing regime). We might easily displace 1800 people from their homes in the course of building a motorway. But this is considered entirely justified for the greater public good. Hmmm.... {15}


NOTES ADDED 5/05/2012
{1} The General Belgrano was formerly a US Navy warship that had seen service in the Pacific in WWII, sold to the Argentinian government in 1951. HMS Sheffield was one of a newish class of Type 42 Destroyers, designed I understand, principally for anti-submarine warfare. Many of this class were involved in the Task Force. The news of the Belgrano's sinking was delayed for a day, from 2nd till 3rd May, perhaps for political reasons, while the loss of the Sheffield was announced fairly promptly, as I recall, on 4th.

{2} This refers to the 'Yom Kippur' War of 1973. The Israelis had occupied the entire Siniai peninsula since the devastatingly effective '6 Day' campaign of 1967, having completely routed the armed forces of all neighbouring Arab states. There was definitely a sense of Israeli 'invincibility' on both sides. However in 1973 for once the Israelis were caught unprepared by a well-planned and executed crossing of the Suez canal by the Egyptian army. Although they quickly recovered and would have 'won' a continued war (international pressure forced a ceasefire) the Israelis reputation for invincibility had been lost. Probably the 'cred' and pride generated allowed Egypt to conclude a peace treaty with Israel a few years later.

{3} TEZ stands for Total Exclusion Zone. This was a circular area 200 miles around the Falklands, declared to be off-limits to Argentinian military activity. This was an important part of the diplomatic game. There was never any declaration of war, presumably because both sides wanted to emphasise their ownership of the Islands, and were merely 'asserting their rights'. The TEZ was a way of setting up Rules of Engagement that could limit casualties, prevent Argentine reinforcements of the occupying forces, and allow Britain to maintain its façade of effortless hands-off power. Having nuclear-powered submarines that could stay on patrol (or even submerged) a long time meant that any naval intrusion into the TEZ would be extremely risky, and presumably the British counted on this factor to keep the zone clear of Argentine ships, while the RAF could prevent aerial intrusions.

{4} One of the first military actions once the Task Force approached the Falklands, was to bomb the  airfields. I personally recall Brian Hanrahan reporting of the bombing harriers 'I counted them all out, and I counted them back', one of the most famous sound-bites of the entire war. That was a mark of the early, smug, invincibility phase of the war, when it was thought possible that Britain would gain the day with no losses whatever.

{5} The Belgrano was clearly outside the exclusion zone, though not by much. In fact it was probably cruising about, only a few tens of miles outside the TEZ. Presumably it was assumed the British would stick to their own rules, so it was an awful shock to everyone when the ship was torpedoed. It didn't really stand much chance. Most of the sailors got off in time and were rescued; about 350 died as a result of the attack itself. This event resulted in another famous sound-bite from an Argentinian diplomat, that 'Brittania may no longer rule the waves, but she certainly waives the rules'. Pretty clever eh?

The sinking of the Belgrano remains the most controversial aspect of the Falklands Affair, and much has been said about it. At the moment it was reported it obviously seemed to my 'diary self' to be unnecessary and 'unfair', but perhaps this only indicates that I had bought in to the British government's  image of effortless surgical power. At a stroke this illusion was destroyed, but we have to note that as a military tactic this action was extremely effective, because it kept the entire Argentine navy bottled up in port for the rest of the war.

{6,7} Daggers, Pucaras, Canberra, various types of Argentinian military aircraft.

{8} The Sheffield was hit by a single French-made Exocet air-to-surface missile, sustained enormous damage, lost 20 men to burns and blast injuries, caught fire and had to be abandoned, later sinking. This was another pivotal moment, immediately following the Belgrano. It was really shocking to see how vulnerable a modern ship could be to a single missile. It gave the impression that the modern Royal Navy made its ships out of plastic. Perhaps even worse, the incident showed that the much-vaunted anti-missile-missile defences had failed. If they failed here, was any part of the fleet safe? Was all this fantastic new military hardware just spin?

{9} The Harrier 'jump jets' were another part of the 'proud to be British' weapons systems, assumed to be superior in every way to the second-hand Argentinian kit. One did not expect to lose any at all, certainly not so early.

{10} This expression shows the fluid emotional narratives going on in my mind. Are wars really like football matches? When the England soccer team plays Argentina away it expects to lose. They are worthy opponents. When England play Leichtenstein there is a tendency to root for the underdog: it's 'not fair'. You can see my mind switching between these points of view.

{11} I cannot remember this joke, but of course there were lots, denigrating the Argentine troops and talking up the Tommies; no doubt in Argentina the same jokes were told the other way round.

{12} Famously, HMS Hood, pride of the Royal Navy, was sunk by the Bismarck in 1941, apparently by one lucky shell penetrating the main magazine and blowing up the whole ship.

{13} See remarks at 8 above. It was so difficult to believe that a whole ship could be sunk by one missile that I was asking myself could it have been just a single lucky shot (like the Hood), or were all the destroyers equally vulnerable? Later events showed it was not merely a lucky shot.

{14} In the original MS there are a couple of paragraph lines, as if I went away for a while and finished later. Yet I am quoting from a newspaper of 5th May, so presumably it was written on the same day.

{15} This is a theme I keep returning to in the diaries: how should we evaluate the interests of the Falkland Islanders? What should they be compared with?  In the UK people are forcibly removed from places where they have no formal permission to live, or through compulsory purchase in the case of major infrastructure projects. Or whole communities are forced to move because local livelihoods (like mines) are summarily closed. Is it a question of interests, or principles? Which principles?

Licensed to Think: A Falklands Diary from 1982

Being new to all this, I really don't know what to do next.
People are emailing me saying they can't post comments.
Perhaps this is the way to do it, but do people have to sign in? Can't you just write something? Dunno. Back later.

Falklands Diary continued

Now I am going to paste up the other 5 pages of the entry on 28th April, and transcribe for my own comments.

NOW I AM GOING TO TRANSCRIBE THE TEXT TO BE EASILY READ, AND SO I CAN MAKE COMMENTS. IT WILL BE LIGHTLY EDITED TO CORRECT OBVIOUS MISTAKES ETC.  NUMBERS IN  BRACKETS {6} WILL REFER TO FOOTNOTES TO EXPLAIN OBSCURITIES OR CONTEMPORARY EVENTS UNFAMILIAR TO A MODERN READER, PLUS OTHER COMMENTS 'AS FROM TODAY'.  A FURTHER SLAB OF COMMENTARY WILL BE MADE ON THE WHOLE ENTRY.     

REMEMBER THAT WHEN THIS WAS WRITTEN IT WAS COMPLETELY SPONTANEOUS, AND OF COURSE I HAD NO IDEA WHAT WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN. SOME OF IT IS A 'RECALL' OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED EARLIER IN THE CRISIS. HERE GOES

[28th April, 1982]

The Falklands Crisis

I'm writing this on the evening of 28th April, having heard that the Task Force is nearing the Islands and some action is expected in the next 48 hours.

I'm writing it because, although I have followed the question closely right from the beginning, I can see my attitudes changing.Also my memory of what I have been thinking is defective, and so I want to fix it before it is irreversibly altered by any shooting.

I want to lay out some of the main issues, what information has been available to me, and what I have thought about various analyses and policies that have been put forward in the media,

First heard of it through James Cameron's {1} column in the Guardian {2}, making light of the issue and the scrap merchants {3}. Already I found it a riveting matter -- kept telling people. Very funny -- Argentinians sending in a carrier that we had sold them; we having no ships available except one on its way to Australia because we couldn't afford to run it.

Next, hearing of the [Argentine] invasion while in London. Having an opportunity to see the telly discussions {4} and talk with Mick {5} about the subject. Seemed to me [that] Britain (or the Foreign Office) had got into the situation through its confidence that everyone would play by the rules. The Falklands policy had been one of "calculated risk"  -- as any reasonable policy had to be. Seemed to be quite comprehensible to me, and the best overall policy in the circumstances.

So for people to criticise Carrington {6} for failure to prepare adequately was like criticising a goalkeeper for jumping the wrong way in a penalty kick. The remark was made that results are what count in politics, not clever plans or good intentions. I felt very strongly about this at the time [of the invasion], and felt it was ridiculous to regard the invasion as a "humiliation" -- because we had behaved reasonably and expected reasonable behaviour in return.

I became increasingly aware that the FO had been trying to give the islands away for years. As this is unofficial, it remains surmise on my part. If true [however] it means that only the Falklanders themselves can have vetoed any transfer of sovereignty. The Argentines claim that the British have been stalling in talks, as if unwilling (in the crude imperial sense) to give up anything. So the "crisis" and the [UK] Govt's response has been [due] to some issue of principle (self determination? punishment of aggression? international lawfulness?).

Against this is an argument that, if we gave the islands back ("back"?) to the Argentines, we might be obliged to resettle the Falklanders in Britain as part of the deal -- the price of their agreement, as it were. This would be simple. But Gibraltar offers a parallel case, with many more people. And Hong Kong!! {7}.  [Is] this why the FO has been stalling? Unwilling to offer the Falklanders the elementary conditions that would induce them to agree to a change because of the precedent thereby created.{8}

Countries supporting each side. Plenty are doing so for obvious political reasons (Venezuela, USSR, Cuba) but many countries are lining up because of alliances or cultural/trade connections. This I have found odd, though understandable. It seems funny for the French foreign minister to back Britain simply because it was a member of the EEC {9}, not because it was defending a legitimate right, or acting against "unprovoked aggression".

Argentina's claim to the islands. Can't get this quite straight. The Spanish had them once.The French had them. After the revolution in what is now Argentina the islands were "deemed" to fall to the new state (and its successor) but they were seized by a British gunboat. Britain has now been in de facto control for 150 years, and English-speaking people have had a majority on the island. Does the actual number of people make any difference to the principle? Supposing it had been 180? 18? 2? {10}.

Can you titrate {11} the (certain?) inconvenience of 1800 {12}against possible death and mutilation for thousands? When is bluff justified for diplomatic ends? You have to convince the enemy you are serious even if you are not ('Chicken' a la Rapoport){13} -- but what happens if your bluff is called?

British in Argentina. Part of the ruling class, therefore get a very good deal out of a right-wing government, as long as they don't rock the boat. They [the Argentines] are puzzled because the Falklanders don't seem to want this. Can the inconvenience to these people [i.e., the British living in Argentina] also be put into the balance? {14}.

Benn {15} seems to have a sensible (if over-rhetorical) approach. Force is too risky. Ask UN to take action. If they will not, the Argentinians get the islands but bad karma {16} for breaking the rules. Britain gets credit for honourable and restrained behaviour -- cheaper also in money, lives and burned embassies {17}.   What about the islanders? Could relocate them. Cynically, we might be glad to get rid of the problem so easily. {18}.

If the islands are retaken with little loss of life & the fleet returns home in triumph, Maggie will be the hero of the hour. If there is a great disaster she may be forced to resign. Likewise, Benn will be either damned as a fainthearted traitor, or lauded as cool-headed and far-sighted, clean of the mass-jingoism that affected both sides of parliament during the first emergency debate. [It is] important for reasonable people to recognise a good policy and give it credit, even when unlikely political events overturn it. Similarly, credit is not due for lucky breaks against the flow of reason and evidence.

Looked good                                       So-so                                  Looked bad

Carrington                                        Thatcher                               Silkin {19}

Benn                                                  Nott {20}

                                                          Foot {21}

                                                          Healey {22}

                                                          Pym {23}

I have found myself fascinated  by military discussion, and the possibility of real fighting. Certainly part of me would enjoy a British victory on exactly the same lines as seeing a favoured team win the cup. Enjoy maps, lists of ships,planes and armaments, estimates of the comparative strengths of the opposing forces, discussions of various attack plans. {24}  These shift from day to day, so I'm not quite sure what's what. According to one account a land invasion of the Falklands was impossible because Argentine air cover was too great without bombing the airfields -- which was diplomatically inadmissible.{25}  Now South Georgia has been [re]taken {26} they [UK]seem to be gearing up for an invasion come what may - perhaps estimating the the British forces are so much more effective (in training, experience, weapons) {27} that they will be able to defeat the Argentines quickly with minimum loss of life.

Reports of Argentine troops begging islanders for food. Is this to be taken seriously? Surely the logistical arrangements are better than that?

What do the islanders think? Do they really want the islands fought over? Do they want to be ferried off? {28}

Chivalry. I was surprised that the Argentines permitted the captured marines to return home {29}. Perhaps this is to emphasise that it is not a war, but a cut-and-dried [diplomatic] issue that has now been resolved. British quid pro quo: captured troops on S. Georgia permitted to go home. Commander of [Argentine] occupying forces and sub[marine] captain entertained by [British] frigate captain.

Are the islanders really that bothered? Contrast the Israelis and their land and their sense of nationhood {30}.

Legal precedents for sovereignty conflicts. Spitsbergen or Kerguelen or one of those antarctic isles. For example  Sovereignty to Norway and administration (mostly) to USSR. Aaland -- population Swedish, closer to Sweden. Finnish sovereignty but a large measure of self-government and its own flag.

 Hong Kong: ultimate sovereignty Chinese but leased by Britain for a limited period. West Irian: UN administration for interim period; referendum; population votes to join Indonesia.

Other disputed territories

Ogaden; Uster; Sakhalin; Kashmir; West Bank, Golan Heights; Quemoy; Tibet; Namibia; Timor; Cyprus; Gibraltar; Beagle Channel Islands; regions of Guyana; Ladakh and N. Indian border; Shatt al Arab; N. Kenya; Spanish Sahara {31}.

End of first entry.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

{1} James Cameron was a famous and prolific left wing reporter and commentator.

{2} The MS has 'Grauniad'. This was the standard mocking misspelling, in acknowledgement of the truly astounding number of typos in the Guardian at that time.

{3} Arguably, the whole affair started when some Argentine scrap merchants landed in South Georgia and started collecting scrap metal. Ostensibly quite a reasonable thing to do, except that South Georgia is technically part of the Falklands group and officially British territory. Foreign entrepreneurs would need permission to operate there, and presumably it would normally be granted as a matter of course. But on this occasion the 'scrap merchants' did not ask permission, and it was widely assumed they were simply a diplomatic ruse to test British preparedness and attitudes. Argentina would say of course that the scrap merchants had every right to be there, no need for diplomatic niceties. This is how 'international incidents' sometimes start, and in this case one certainly did.

{4} The remark about TV might seem odd but at the time I did not have a TV and got my information only through print and radio.

{5} 'Mick' is my brother M.J.Harper, who lived (and still lives) in London. He is a practising historian with profound knowledge of both history and geography, so naturally he had well-informed views on the matter.

{6} Lord Peter Carrington was the Foreign Secretary at the time. Personally I thought he conducted himself well, but was of course blamed for 'failing to prevent the invasion', and subsequently resigned. He was still highly regarded as an able statesman and later became secretary general of NATO.

{7} Of course we all now know that Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 on the legal expiry of the 99-year lease. Even in the early eighties this was being anticipated, and inevitably raised the question of the rights of the Hong Kong people, many of whom held British passports.

{8} If the Falkland Islanders were given rights of residence after a transfer of sovereignty, the same principle ought to apply to UK passport holders in Hong Kong. This problem was eventually 'solved' by changing the status of the vast majority of Hong Kong passport holders. The same problem applies to Gibraltar.

{9} EEC was what we then called the 'European Economic Community', precursor to the EU.

{10} This is one of the most interesting points in the Diary.  How many 'British' people are required to generate an international crisis of this magnitude? Or is it simply a matter of territory? What if nobody at all had lived on the Falklands? Technically, it would still have constituted a challenge to UK sovereignty and the due process of international law, but would that have been enough to launch a task force costing several billions of pounds? Presumably not. It was reported that 1800 people lived on the Falklands. By way of comparison, it is quite credible that such a number of people could be forced to move through compulsory purchase orders for a project of national importance, such as a motorway. It would have been cheaper to give them each a million quid and tell them to apply for New Zealand citizenship 

{11} The word 'titrate' might not be familiar (it comes from chemistry) but essentially means 'balance'.

{12} At the time of this diary entry I believed the 1800 number to cover all permanent residents of the Falklands.

{13} The game of 'chicken' might be familar from the movie Rebel without a Cause. Two drivers head straight at each other, and the first to swerve loses. This was formalised in Game Theory by various theorists, including Anatol Rapaport, whose desk I once inherited at the University of Michigan (he had gone off to Canada in disgust at the Vietnam war). It might not actually have been Rapaport (although the Diary obviously thinks so) but one of those theorists pointed out that the best way to win would be to rip off the steering wheel and ostentatiously throw it out of the window. Then your opponent would know you could not control the car anyway, and would be forced to swerve. In the Falklands context, the UK might never have really intended or expected a shooting war, but it had to impress on its opponents its deadly intentions. In the end of course its bluff was called.

{14} It is surprising that not more was made of this. Had the Islanders agreed to a deal, they could more or less have written their own cheques and lived happily ever after on the Islands themselves or in nicer parts of Argentina. Meanwhile there were of course far more British passport holders in Argentina than in the Falklands, and an enormous historical residue of links between the two countries.  At a certain price, a deal was obviously possible.

{15} Tony Benn, Anthony Wedgewood Benn, formerly Lord Stansgate, was the left-wing bete noir of the  80s parliaments. He steadfastly opposed the war, and did not later recant. It is striking that the Labour Party leader, Michael Foot, another left-winger and luminary of the CND movement, could not, in his position, oppose the sending of the task force.

{16} 'Karma' is a sanskrit term referring, among other things, to the nemesis that inevitably flows from evildoing. It was in widespread use in some circles at the time. In the Falklands context, it would have meant a loss of prestige to the Argentinian state, and possible diplomatic sanctions and other difficulties.

{17} In contrast, the UK's credentials would have been burnished because it had gone by the book, upheld international law, and suffered unjustly. One cannot help comparing it with the situation of the USA after 9/11. The US was the beneficiary of enormous sympathy and good will, and could have capitalised on this by seeking better understandings from its antagonists, thereby undermining their popular support. Instead, it chose a 'hard power' route, with precisely the opposite effects.

That is the 'enlightened' view. In the Falklands context however, we cannot avoid the eventual physical result and its benign short-term effects for the British government and the national mood.

{18} Nobody seems to have recognised the potential solution to the 'Hong Kong problem'. After the invasion, the Falkland islanders could have been given the option of staying, under Argentine rule, or relocating to the UK or anywhere that would have them. That would have been extremely cheap, and would not have created a precedent. The Falklands and their inhabitants would have been off our hands at minimum cost.  There is some comparison with Northern Ireland in the Troubles, where I am pretty sure the vast majority of the UK population would have been only too happy to hand the whole squabbling lot over to the Irish Republic, and welcome. Probably still true.

{19} Jon Silkin was the Shadow Defence Secretary. I cannot remember now why I thought so ill of him.

{20} John Nott was the Defence Secretary. I remember thinking of him as  more like a civil servant than a politician, a considerable compliment.  

{21} Michael Foot I have mentioned already. As I recall he made much of the evils of the military dictatorship in Argentina, and this allowed a cross-party agreement to send the task force

{22} Dennis Healey was the Shadow Foreign Secretary. He was undoubtedly one of the 'big beasts' and a very able politician. In the Wilson/Callaghan era he had been a strong supporter of  the UK independent deterrent, but found ways to change his mind after he lost the leadership election to Michael Foot. One might have expected the Labour Party to oppose the sending of the Task Force, and that probably would have scuppered it, as it were. A strange moment.

{23} Francis Pym became Foreign Secretary after Carrington resigned. I  think he was one of the 'wets' but I cannot remember.

{24} This was fascinating to me, and probably a very 'boy' thing. I had after all been brought up on war movies in the 40s and 50s, but I had also enjoyed quasi-military 'wide games' in the scouts, perhaps lasting several days and entailing elaborate strategic planning. As in a football or cricket match, it is hard to avoid taking sides, and when it comes to national sides I'm right there. When Wales won the grand slam this year I spent all day on a high. And I was there at that moment at The Oval when it was suddenly clear we'd got the Ashes back after a long, long time. Wow. [Don't ask me to explain my ethnic complexities]. So there you are, I'm like most guys in this respect. When it comes to the UK's armed forces, I do buy into the 'cool professionalism' schtick and I'm rather proud of 'our boys'. That's what I was expecting. I expected them to win with cool professionalism and meticulous attention to the Rules of Engagement.

But remember that on the date of this Diary entry, the landings had still not taken place, and there was still a strong possibility of a diplomatic solution.

{25} This is also intriguing. Both sides are pretending it's not really a war. War was never declared. But had we bombed the Argentinian mainland it would clearly have been 'an act of war'. It was really about "Possession is nine tenths of the law". When the Argentines occupied the Falklands they could call the shots, and the whole process was trying to restore something of the status quo ante. But it had to be done clinically, according to internationally agreed standards.

The other important implication of this remark is that some people thought a counter-invasion was technically unviable, and the whole task force therefore simply a symbolic show of force. The question was: did the Argentine military know this? Did they think it? Who knew/thought what? Was the whole thing just a giant gamble to feed Maggie's yen to be clothed in the mantle of Boadicea?

{26} South Georgia was an easy recapture, and carried out with military courtesy. This contributed greatly to my personal narrative of the impeccable professionalism and restraint of the British military, broadly comparable to pride in the contemporary England Test squad.

{27} I assumed too, that we had better kit. In particular a great deal was made of the anti-missile-missiles that essentially made the fleet invulnerable to attack by cruise or ballistic missiles.

{28} One possibility at the time was that the island population could have been evacuated, out of harm's way. But by whom? How? And where to? And how would that have altered the political equations?  I am reminded of the decision by the wartime British government not to defend the Channel Islands in 1940: they were not defensible and thousands would have been killed to no ultimate purpose. Likewise, at the end of the war the occupied Channel Islands were bypassed and left in enemy hands for months while France was invaded. The occupation troops were not 'permitted' to surrender and had to simply hang on under hopeless circumstances, and it would still have been dangerous to attempt an opposed liberation.

{29} See {26} above. I am a sucker for these civilities among military opponents, like the famous Christmas football matches between German and British troops in 1916.

{30} Even at this early stage in the diary you can detect a dark suspicion that the Falklanders are taking us all for a ride. They do not really regard the Islands as 'home' but are happy enough that others are looking after their interests at colossal expense. The contrast is with 'settlers' in Israel, perhaps only arrived a few years ago, with an utterly fanatical attachment to particular bits of physical land; and nothing else will do.

{31} These are all examples of various arrangements that can be, and could have been, made to resolve sovereignty disputes.  There are lots of solutions, and the UN is only too willing to help. But the Diary generates a feeling that both sides were intent on conflict because if successful it would be to their political advantage.

Incidentally from today's perspective I am a bit surprised that my 37-year-old self was so knowledgeable about territorial disputes around the world. This was just something written in haste on the kitchen table, not in a university library. I know far less today.

However in most respects I think the Diary represents what must have been very common thoughts in the left-leaning chattering classes of the time.

NEXT ENTRY: MAY 5

A Falklands Diary from 1982

During the British military campaign in the Falklands in 1982, I kept an occasional 'diary' simply to record my feelings and opinions at the time. As I wrote, I did not of course know what was going to happen, so it has a certain 'innocence' and shines a light on contemporary events both then and now.

The diary, consisting of 21 handwritten pages on lined foolscap paper, was not written for publication. But since we are now 'celebrating' a 40-year anniversary I thought it would be interesting to dig it out and paste it into the blog, with comments and annotations.

My plan is to publish the first few pages, dated 28th April 1982, somewhat earlier in April, then further 'instalments' on the actual dates, but 40 years later.  I shall reproduce the actual MS, but also provide a typewritten version that will allow explanatory notes for obscurities, and a hook for further contemporary comment, from myself or from guests on the site. To give you an idea, the first page is shown here.

Being a completely new blogger, I am not sure exactly how it is going to work, but I'm open to suggestions.