NOW I AM GOING TO TRANSCRIBE THE TEXT TO BE EASILY READ, AND SO I CAN MAKE COMMENTS. IT WILL BE LIGHTLY EDITED TO CORRECT OBVIOUS MISTAKES ETC. NUMBERS IN BRACKETS {6} WILL REFER TO FOOTNOTES TO EXPLAIN OBSCURITIES OR CONTEMPORARY EVENTS UNFAMILIAR TO A MODERN READER, PLUS OTHER COMMENTS 'AS FROM TODAY'. A FURTHER SLAB OF COMMENTARY WILL BE MADE ON THE WHOLE ENTRY.
REMEMBER THAT WHEN THIS WAS WRITTEN IT WAS COMPLETELY SPONTANEOUS, AND OF COURSE I HAD NO IDEA WHAT WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN. SOME OF IT IS A 'RECALL' OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED EARLIER IN THE CRISIS. HERE GOES
[28th April, 1982]
The Falklands Crisis
I'm writing this on the evening of 28th April, having heard that the Task Force is nearing the Islands and some action is expected in the next 48 hours.
I'm writing it because, although I have followed the question closely right from the beginning, I can see my attitudes changing.Also my memory of what I have been thinking is defective, and so I want to fix it before it is irreversibly altered by any shooting.
I want to lay out some of the main issues, what information has been available to me, and what I have thought about various analyses and policies that have been put forward in the media,
First heard of it through James Cameron's {1} column in the Guardian {2}, making light of the issue and the scrap merchants {3}. Already I found it a riveting matter -- kept telling people. Very funny -- Argentinians sending in a carrier that we had sold them; we having no ships available except one on its way to Australia because we couldn't afford to run it.
Next, hearing of the [Argentine] invasion while in London. Having an opportunity to see the telly discussions {4} and talk with Mick {5} about the subject. Seemed to me [that] Britain (or the Foreign Office) had got into the situation through its confidence that everyone would play by the rules. The Falklands policy had been one of "calculated risk" -- as any reasonable policy had to be. Seemed to be quite comprehensible to me, and the best overall policy in the circumstances.
So for people to criticise Carrington {6} for failure to prepare adequately was like criticising a goalkeeper for jumping the wrong way in a penalty kick. The remark was made that results are what count in politics, not clever plans or good intentions. I felt very strongly about this at the time [of the invasion], and felt it was ridiculous to regard the invasion as a "humiliation" -- because we had behaved reasonably and expected reasonable behaviour in return.
I became increasingly aware that the FO had been trying to give the islands away for years. As this is unofficial, it remains surmise on my part. If true [however] it means that only the Falklanders themselves can have vetoed any transfer of sovereignty. The Argentines claim that the British have been stalling in talks, as if unwilling (in the crude imperial sense) to give up anything. So the "crisis" and the [UK] Govt's response has been [due] to some issue of principle (self determination? punishment of aggression? international lawfulness?).
Against this is an argument that, if we gave the islands back ("back"?) to the Argentines, we might be obliged to resettle the Falklanders in Britain as part of the deal -- the price of their agreement, as it were. This would be simple. But Gibraltar offers a parallel case, with many more people. And Hong Kong!! {7}. [Is] this why the FO has been stalling? Unwilling to offer the Falklanders the elementary conditions that would induce them to agree to a change because of the precedent thereby created.{8}
Countries supporting each side. Plenty are doing so for obvious political reasons (Venezuela, USSR, Cuba) but many countries are lining up because of alliances or cultural/trade connections. This I have found odd, though understandable. It seems funny for the French foreign minister to back Britain simply because it was a member of the EEC {9}, not because it was defending a legitimate right, or acting against "unprovoked aggression".
Argentina's claim to the islands. Can't get this quite straight. The Spanish had them once.The French had them. After the revolution in what is now Argentina the islands were "deemed" to fall to the new state (and its successor) but they were seized by a British gunboat. Britain has now been in de facto control for 150 years, and English-speaking people have had a majority on the island. Does the actual number of people make any difference to the principle? Supposing it had been 180? 18? 2? {10}.
Can you titrate {11} the (certain?) inconvenience of 1800 {12}against possible death and mutilation for thousands? When is bluff justified for diplomatic ends? You have to convince the enemy you are serious even if you are not ('Chicken' a la Rapoport){13} -- but what happens if your bluff is called?
British in Argentina. Part of the ruling class, therefore get a very good deal out of a right-wing government, as long as they don't rock the boat. They [the Argentines] are puzzled because the Falklanders don't seem to want this. Can the inconvenience to these people [i.e., the British living in Argentina] also be put into the balance? {14}.
Benn {15} seems to have a sensible (if over-rhetorical) approach. Force is too risky. Ask UN to take action. If they will not, the Argentinians get the islands but bad karma {16} for breaking the rules. Britain gets credit for honourable and restrained behaviour -- cheaper also in money, lives and burned embassies {17}. What about the islanders? Could relocate them. Cynically, we might be glad to get rid of the problem so easily. {18}.
If the islands are retaken with little loss of life & the fleet returns home in triumph, Maggie will be the hero of the hour. If there is a great disaster she may be forced to resign. Likewise, Benn will be either damned as a fainthearted traitor, or lauded as cool-headed and far-sighted, clean of the mass-jingoism that affected both sides of parliament during the first emergency debate. [It is] important for reasonable people to recognise a good policy and give it credit, even when unlikely political events overturn it. Similarly, credit is not due for lucky breaks against the flow of reason and evidence.
Looked good So-so Looked bad
Carrington Thatcher Silkin {19}
Benn Nott {20}
Foot {21}
Healey {22}
Pym {23}
I have found myself fascinated by military discussion, and the possibility of real fighting. Certainly part of me would enjoy a British victory on exactly the same lines as seeing a favoured team win the cup. Enjoy maps, lists of ships,planes and armaments, estimates of the comparative strengths of the opposing forces, discussions of various attack plans. {24} These shift from day to day, so I'm not quite sure what's what. According to one account a land invasion of the Falklands was impossible because Argentine air cover was too great without bombing the airfields -- which was diplomatically inadmissible.{25} Now South Georgia has been [re]taken {26} they [UK]seem to be gearing up for an invasion come what may - perhaps estimating the the British forces are so much more effective (in training, experience, weapons) {27} that they will be able to defeat the Argentines quickly with minimum loss of life.
Reports of Argentine troops begging islanders for food. Is this to be taken seriously? Surely the logistical arrangements are better than that?
What do the islanders think? Do they really want the islands fought over? Do they want to be ferried off? {28}
Chivalry. I was surprised that the Argentines permitted the captured marines to return home {29}. Perhaps this is to emphasise that it is not a war, but a cut-and-dried [diplomatic] issue that has now been resolved. British quid pro quo: captured troops on S. Georgia permitted to go home. Commander of [Argentine] occupying forces and sub[marine] captain entertained by [British] frigate captain.
Are the islanders really that bothered? Contrast the Israelis and their land and their sense of nationhood {30}.
Legal precedents for sovereignty conflicts. Spitsbergen or Kerguelen or one of those antarctic isles. For example Sovereignty to Norway and administration (mostly) to USSR. Aaland -- population Swedish, closer to Sweden. Finnish sovereignty but a large measure of self-government and its own flag.
Hong Kong: ultimate sovereignty Chinese but leased by Britain for a limited period. West Irian: UN administration for interim period; referendum; population votes to join Indonesia.
Other disputed territories
Ogaden; Uster; Sakhalin; Kashmir; West Bank, Golan Heights; Quemoy; Tibet; Namibia; Timor; Cyprus; Gibraltar; Beagle Channel Islands; regions of Guyana; Ladakh and N. Indian border; Shatt al Arab; N. Kenya; Spanish Sahara {31}.
End of first entry.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
{1} James Cameron was a famous and prolific left wing reporter and commentator.
{2} The MS has 'Grauniad'. This was the standard mocking misspelling, in acknowledgement of the truly astounding number of typos in the Guardian at that time.
{3} Arguably, the whole affair started when some Argentine scrap merchants landed in South Georgia and started collecting scrap metal. Ostensibly quite a reasonable thing to do, except that South Georgia is technically part of the Falklands group and officially British territory. Foreign entrepreneurs would need permission to operate there, and presumably it would normally be granted as a matter of course. But on this occasion the 'scrap merchants' did not ask permission, and it was widely assumed they were simply a diplomatic ruse to test British preparedness and attitudes. Argentina would say of course that the scrap merchants had every right to be there, no need for diplomatic niceties. This is how 'international incidents' sometimes start, and in this case one certainly did.
{4} The remark about TV might seem odd but at the time I did not have a TV and got my information only through print and radio.
{5} 'Mick' is my brother M.J.Harper, who lived (and still lives) in London. He is a practising historian with profound knowledge of both history and geography, so naturally he had well-informed views on the matter.
{6} Lord Peter Carrington was the Foreign Secretary at the time. Personally I thought he conducted himself well, but was of course blamed for 'failing to prevent the invasion', and subsequently resigned. He was still highly regarded as an able statesman and later became secretary general of NATO.
{7} Of course we all now know that Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 on the legal expiry of the 99-year lease. Even in the early eighties this was being anticipated, and inevitably raised the question of the rights of the Hong Kong people, many of whom held British passports.
{8} If the Falkland Islanders were given rights of residence after a transfer of sovereignty, the same principle ought to apply to UK passport holders in Hong Kong. This problem was eventually 'solved' by changing the status of the vast majority of Hong Kong passport holders. The same problem applies to Gibraltar.
{9} EEC was what we then called the 'European Economic Community', precursor to the EU.
{10} This is one of the most interesting points in the Diary. How many 'British' people are required to generate an international crisis of this magnitude? Or is it simply a matter of territory? What if nobody at all had lived on the Falklands? Technically, it would still have constituted a challenge to UK sovereignty and the due process of international law, but would that have been enough to launch a task force costing several billions of pounds? Presumably not. It was reported that 1800 people lived on the Falklands. By way of comparison, it is quite credible that such a number of people could be forced to move through compulsory purchase orders for a project of national importance, such as a motorway. It would have been cheaper to give them each a million quid and tell them to apply for New Zealand citizenship
{11} The word 'titrate' might not be familiar (it comes from chemistry) but essentially means 'balance'.
{12} At the time of this diary entry I believed the 1800 number to cover all permanent residents of the Falklands.
{13} The game of 'chicken' might be familar from the movie Rebel without a Cause. Two drivers head straight at each other, and the first to swerve loses. This was formalised in Game Theory by various theorists, including Anatol Rapaport, whose desk I once inherited at the University of Michigan (he had gone off to Canada in disgust at the Vietnam war). It might not actually have been Rapaport (although the Diary obviously thinks so) but one of those theorists pointed out that the best way to win would be to rip off the steering wheel and ostentatiously throw it out of the window. Then your opponent would know you could not control the car anyway, and would be forced to swerve. In the Falklands context, the UK might never have really intended or expected a shooting war, but it had to impress on its opponents its deadly intentions. In the end of course its bluff was called.
{14} It is surprising that not more was made of this. Had the Islanders agreed to a deal, they could more or less have written their own cheques and lived happily ever after on the Islands themselves or in nicer parts of Argentina. Meanwhile there were of course far more British passport holders in Argentina than in the Falklands, and an enormous historical residue of links between the two countries. At a certain price, a deal was obviously possible.
{15} Tony Benn, Anthony Wedgewood Benn, formerly Lord Stansgate, was the left-wing bete noir of the 80s parliaments. He steadfastly opposed the war, and did not later recant. It is striking that the Labour Party leader, Michael Foot, another left-winger and luminary of the CND movement, could not, in his position, oppose the sending of the task force.
{16} 'Karma' is a sanskrit term referring, among other things, to the nemesis that inevitably flows from evildoing. It was in widespread use in some circles at the time. In the Falklands context, it would have meant a loss of prestige to the Argentinian state, and possible diplomatic sanctions and other difficulties.
{17} In contrast, the UK's credentials would have been burnished because it had gone by the book, upheld international law, and suffered unjustly. One cannot help comparing it with the situation of the USA after 9/11. The US was the beneficiary of enormous sympathy and good will, and could have capitalised on this by seeking better understandings from its antagonists, thereby undermining their popular support. Instead, it chose a 'hard power' route, with precisely the opposite effects.
That is the 'enlightened' view. In the Falklands context however, we cannot avoid the eventual physical result and its benign short-term effects for the British government and the national mood.
{18} Nobody seems to have recognised the potential solution to the 'Hong Kong problem'. After the invasion, the Falkland islanders could have been given the option of staying, under Argentine rule, or relocating to the UK or anywhere that would have them. That would have been extremely cheap, and would not have created a precedent. The Falklands and their inhabitants would have been off our hands at minimum cost. There is some comparison with Northern Ireland in the Troubles, where I am pretty sure the vast majority of the UK population would have been only too happy to hand the whole squabbling lot over to the Irish Republic, and welcome. Probably still true.
{19} Jon Silkin was the Shadow Defence Secretary. I cannot remember now why I thought so ill of him.
{20} John Nott was the Defence Secretary. I remember thinking of him as more like a civil servant than a politician, a considerable compliment.
{21} Michael Foot I have mentioned already. As I recall he made much of the evils of the military dictatorship in Argentina, and this allowed a cross-party agreement to send the task force
{22} Dennis Healey was the Shadow Foreign Secretary. He was undoubtedly one of the 'big beasts' and a very able politician. In the Wilson/Callaghan era he had been a strong supporter of the UK independent deterrent, but found ways to change his mind after he lost the leadership election to Michael Foot. One might have expected the Labour Party to oppose the sending of the Task Force, and that probably would have scuppered it, as it were. A strange moment.
{23} Francis Pym became Foreign Secretary after Carrington resigned. I think he was one of the 'wets' but I cannot remember.
{24} This was fascinating to me, and probably a very 'boy' thing. I had after all been brought up on war movies in the 40s and 50s, but I had also enjoyed quasi-military 'wide games' in the scouts, perhaps lasting several days and entailing elaborate strategic planning. As in a football or cricket match, it is hard to avoid taking sides, and when it comes to national sides I'm right there. When Wales won the grand slam this year I spent all day on a high. And I was there at that moment at The Oval when it was suddenly clear we'd got the Ashes back after a long, long time. Wow. [Don't ask me to explain my ethnic complexities]. So there you are, I'm like most guys in this respect. When it comes to the UK's armed forces, I do buy into the 'cool professionalism' schtick and I'm rather proud of 'our boys'. That's what I was expecting. I expected them to win with cool professionalism and meticulous attention to the Rules of Engagement.
But remember that on the date of this Diary entry, the landings had still not taken place, and there was still a strong possibility of a diplomatic solution.
{25} This is also intriguing. Both sides are pretending it's not really a war. War was never declared. But had we bombed the Argentinian mainland it would clearly have been 'an act of war'. It was really about "Possession is nine tenths of the law". When the Argentines occupied the Falklands they could call the shots, and the whole process was trying to restore something of the status quo ante. But it had to be done clinically, according to internationally agreed standards.
The other important implication of this remark is that some people thought a counter-invasion was technically unviable, and the whole task force therefore simply a symbolic show of force. The question was: did the Argentine military know this? Did they think it? Who knew/thought what? Was the whole thing just a giant gamble to feed Maggie's yen to be clothed in the mantle of Boadicea?
{26} South Georgia was an easy recapture, and carried out with military courtesy. This contributed greatly to my personal narrative of the impeccable professionalism and restraint of the British military, broadly comparable to pride in the contemporary England Test squad.
{27} I assumed too, that we had better kit. In particular a great deal was made of the anti-missile-missiles that essentially made the fleet invulnerable to attack by cruise or ballistic missiles.
{28} One possibility at the time was that the island population could have been evacuated, out of harm's way. But by whom? How? And where to? And how would that have altered the political equations? I am reminded of the decision by the wartime British government not to defend the Channel Islands in 1940: they were not defensible and thousands would have been killed to no ultimate purpose. Likewise, at the end of the war the occupied Channel Islands were bypassed and left in enemy hands for months while France was invaded. The occupation troops were not 'permitted' to surrender and had to simply hang on under hopeless circumstances, and it would still have been dangerous to attempt an opposed liberation.
{29} See {26} above. I am a sucker for these civilities among military opponents, like the famous Christmas football matches between German and British troops in 1916.
{30} Even at this early stage in the diary you can detect a dark suspicion that the Falklanders are taking us all for a ride. They do not really regard the Islands as 'home' but are happy enough that others are looking after their interests at colossal expense. The contrast is with 'settlers' in Israel, perhaps only arrived a few years ago, with an utterly fanatical attachment to particular bits of physical land; and nothing else will do.
{31} These are all examples of various arrangements that can be, and could have been, made to resolve sovereignty disputes. There are lots of solutions, and the UN is only too willing to help. But the Diary generates a feeling that both sides were intent on conflict because if successful it would be to their political advantage.
Incidentally from today's perspective I am a bit surprised that my 37-year-old self was so knowledgeable about territorial disputes around the world. This was just something written in haste on the kitchen table, not in a university library. I know far less today.
However in most respects I think the Diary represents what must have been very common thoughts in the left-leaning chattering classes of the time.
NEXT ENTRY: MAY 5
