THIS WILL BE THE FINAL POST FOR THE FALKLANDS DIARY SERIES

There are only three more entries, and I shall be away for the dates of the last two, ironically perhaps in Greece during the critical elections of 17th June 2012 and witness to events of potentially greater moment than the Falklands war.

 Apparently readers are still finding it difficult to leave comments, but one has discovered a method via the 'about me' section of the blog. My brother thinks the whole Blogger/Blogspot product is a complete lemon, and perhaps he is right. I simply can't tell and haven't got time to get to the bottom of it all. It's not such a big deal, and I might as well get the whole thing pasted up.  So here we go.

2nd June
Left Britain for Ireland on 28 May, no access to newspapers or radio until today. Bought The Irish Press (2 June). Reports of the action seem much as in British papers. But an "assessment" article by one Adrian English is openly critical of Britain & sceptical of MoD announcements.{1}
 "... the magnitude of the British military successes...has undoubtedly been greatly exaggerated by British propaganda..."   "the high degree of professional competence of the [Argentine] Air Force & the heroism of its pilots, both now grudgingly admitted by the British, who have been at pains to deny the Argentines any credit for their military success in this most futile and unnecessary of wars." "[The Argentine] air force still appears to retain sufficient strength to mount air strikes at hourly intervals, as has been admitted in an unguarded moment by one of the reporters with the British force." "The British...would seem to have lost most of their sea harriers, and their aircraft carriers have almost certainly sustained some damage."  
 Good to hear another view, but I certainly wonder what effect ritual anti-British attitudes have on Irish perceptions of the affair.{2}


Another aspect that has 'come to light' -- as reported in the F[inancial]T[imes] of 1st June, which I also saw today, is the ill-treatment of the Islanders by Argentinian forces -- over a hundred being locked up in the community hall for 30 days. {3} This was perhaps just a military precaution to prevent any messages being sent to the British fleet. It is claimed that houses were looted and smashed up. This is hard to judge. Possibly houses have been requisitioned and broken into; perhaps used as shelters against bombardment. Or maybe it's just indiscipline among inexperienced troops under great stress.{4}
Also a report that a clump of napalm bombs had been found, and some had been used to attack troops. If true, it's as nasty as the British used of fragmentation bombs on Port Stanley airport.{5}


FT says Argentines are drawing a parallel between the defence of Port Stanley and the 'resistance of the Spartans against the Persians.' So they do expect to lose?


Once again we have to remember that they think the islands are theirs, and that they are there by right  -- & [we should] interpret their actions in this light. Also consider how they must view our actions. Seems the British government is determined to go for a complete military victory, while many opposition voices are urging it (her?) to seek a conciliatory solution that will not leave an embittered enemy seeking retribution. {6}

COMMENTS
{1} It is hard to know how representative this article is, but I recall my general impression that the view of the war was strikingly different in Ireland; that I was slightly surprised; and that I had to remind myself that it was not after all very surprising!  Ireland had opposed EEC sanctions on Argentina.
The author of these comments does seem to have an anti-British take. He confounds the official government view with reportage.  He is entirely wrong about damage to the aircraft carriers (there was none) and loss of Sea Harriers (only six were lost, four to accidents and none to aerial combat; while they shot down 28 Argentine aircraft). But such speculation must have been 'in the air', at least in Ireland, and must have seemed plausible.

{2} It is worth remembering all this occurred during 'the troubles', and naturally most Irish would tend to sympathise with the Nationalists in the North, seeing the UK as artificially maintaining an unnatural status quo,  not entirely unlike the Falklands situation.  Having said this, I vividly recall the warmth and friendliness of the rural Ireland of the early 80s, and encountered no personal animosity at all.

Perhaps the 'notional animosity' is restricted to the political class?  Things seem much friendlier now, perhaps because the 'Celtic Tiger' period gave Ireland a taste of economic superiority that washed away historical resentments. The 'new troubles', such as they are, are clearly not of Britain's making.

{3} This 'incarceration' report is apparently correct, but not as bad as it sounds. There was no ill-treatment. After some initial hiccoughs, it appears that the new Argentine authorities, largely in the hands of Argentinians of British descent, went to some lengths to treat the population as well as possible. However, here you can see the FT giving an anti-Argentine spin

{4} There are often isolated 'atrocities' committed by mostly junior troops in the 'heat of the situation'.  My impression is that there is as much evidence for British as of Argentinian 'minor war crimes', although I don't think there have been any prosecutions. By comparison with parts of the second world war, or with subsequent events in the Balkans, the Falklands War was extremely decorous.

{5} These are cases in point: napalm and cluster-bombs are horrible but not illegal.

{6} By this stage the Argentinian government was back at the UN trying to get a negotiated settlement that it could have achieved much earlier. Probably Britain should have opted for magnanimity , but at this point, going for an outright military victory was probably irresistible.


June 16
Returned to Britain to view the rest of the story. As I write this the Government & by all appearances most people, are celebrating a great victory.


I feel antagonistic now to the whole enterprise, but as before a certain jingoistic part of me is pleased by the success of the armed forces  & the efficiency of "our boys". {1}  The final death toll must approach the number of people on the islands when the fighting began. {2}   Had they known at the beginning, would this have changed the Falklanders' attitudes to a rapprochement with Argentina (i.e. involving them [Argentinians] increasingly in running the place)? {3}


Evidently the blockade was not as effective as we were told. [Argentine] Ships and other air transports were able to get through. Recall reports early in the crisis that Britain had the power to block electronically all radio communications with Argentina.  Bluff? Technological jingoism? Mythmongering? {4}


If the Argentinians had waited for the next labour government, they would probably have got a good foot in the door without very much trouble.{5} Had they accepted any of the various deals on offer during the "buildup" they would be a great deal better off either than they were at the beginning or than they are now. Thus far would "aggression have been rewarded". {6}


Bob Priddy reports having been in favour of sending the Taskforce from the outset.{7} He mentions an article by Naipaul {8}about Argentina (I must have read a report of this) which describes the "Malvinas Myth" of the Argentines. This myth makes the Malvinas much bigger, richer and more wonderful. {9}


COMMENTS
{1} I suppose that for the citizen of any nation it gives a feeling of security to think that the armed forces are effective. But probably more significant is 'marketing the national brand'. One gets the impression that military capability is something we do well, like aero-engines, or rowing, or pageantry, or popular music.   One wants to ask, is it worth the money? Does it contribute to the sum-total of human welfare?


{2} About 1000 deaths in the war, compared with about 1800 residents before the war, but evidently most of these were not 'proper' Falklanders, of whom there appear to have been only a few hundred.


{3} This is a good question. I don't recall it was ever asked. Nobody's life was threatened by the possibility of closer ties with Argentina; it was little more than a sense of political discomfort, although perhaps the fact that Argentina at the time was a military dictatorship, would have made a considerable difference to both feelings and political calculations.


{4} I suppose it is a good military trick to exude invincibility, and at the beginning of the conflict I bought into it myself.


I am intrigued by the frequent unreliability of equipment and weapons systems. Comparing with reports of other conflicts, where some stuff just doesn't work, and the combatants don't find out until too late (Pacific naval battle of the Coral Sea comes to mind). Here the Harriers and their armaments were really good, but the sea-to-air missiles were not. The Exocets were incredible, but lots of Argentinian bombs simply didn't go off. Is it invariably hit and miss? The affair was probably much more finely balanced than is commonly believed. If more bombs had gone off, and the Argentines had not run out of Exocets...


{5} Interesting historical what-if. Before the Falklands War, Mrs Thatcher was not popular, but the War brought her back to power with hugely increased confidence and relish for political battle that kept Labour out of power for 18 years. Had the Argentine junta not provoked the war, a return of a Labour government might have happened much sooner. But most governments, even dictatorships, cannot really think in such long-range strategic terms. More exactly in this context, had the Junta waited just a few more months before invading, the southern winter would probably have made a prompt counter-invasion impractical. Very likely it would have been difficult to build the political will for such a Task Force once the initial shock of an affront to British sovereignty had worn off.


{6} Well-timed unilateral action, including armed aggression, can obviously result in permanent advantages. The Israelis famously like to create create 'facts on the ground' that the Palestinians are powerless to resist, and that later become established as bargaining counters.  It was much the same with the state of the western and Soviet troops as they converged in 1945 Germany. Both sides were aware that the actual territory occupied would have a strong bearing on their respective post-war zones of influence. No doubt the Argentinian junta also thought 'possession is nine-tenths of the law' when they invaded the Falklands, and they were unfortunate not to get away with it.


It's probably as well to remark at this point that, as a result of the War, the Junta was forced to resign in disgrace, and democracy returned to Argentina. That is a very good result, although not the prime purpose of the British demarche.


{7} Bob Priddy was a British friend who lived in Norway and had become effectively Norwegian. I think his political attitudes were similar to my own, so it is interesting that he was in some sense 'in favour of the war'.


{8} V.S. Naipaul was a distinguished novelist and critic, a great traveller, noted for his independent and incisive views about all manner of cultural and ethnic issues.


{9} The 'myth of the Malvinas' suggests deliberate cultivation of a particular narrative that is not entirely under the control of the original myth-makers, and develops its own popular momentum. It could be an only-slightly more sophisticated version of the Big Rock Candy Mountain. One imagines incredible tales being wound round the Malvinas for the benefit of children, that persist, at least emotionally, into adulthood.


Of course such ethnic myth-making can have tragic and enduring consequences, as we have remarked before in these comments. But if there can be malign and dysfunctional myths, can there also be benign myths that promote harmony? 


June 22.
Diego Garcia --- 1200 islanders moved compulsorily to Mauritius to make way for a military establishment.  


COMMENT
This is the last entry in the diary. It might be surprising that my former self did not elaborate, since it is the most extraordinary "fact" in the whole document. The entry is slightly misleading because it suggests that the islanders were expelled in June 1982. This is not the case, but nevertheless there are substantial parallels with the Falklands situation.


In the early 60s the UK government came to an agreement with the US government to provide an 'uninhabited island' in the Indian Ocean to serve as a naval and air base.  Aldabra was initially favoured, but was known to be the home of the endemic Aldabra tortoise, so was vetoed on conservation grounds. Diego Garcia in the Chagos island group fitted the bill in terms of location and geography, but unfortunately about 1500 people lived there. Most of these were 'Ilois', speaking a local ('Chagossian') French creole. Like the Falkland islanders they had only been there a hundred years or so, and traced ancestry elsewhere (in Mauritius or the Seychelles). In accordance with the military agreement the inhabitants were compulsorily expelled, principally to Mauritius, between 1968 and 1973. It is interesting that a population of tortoises were enough to prevent the first choice, but a population of humans did not prevent the second.


So the diary entry refers to a fact that had happened some time previously.  There was no referendum, no referral to the UN, and no rights of return. The 'Ilois' were just moved, and given compensation. This happened largely under Labour administrations in Britain. 


The legal and ethical situation was rather complicated. For one thing the British apparently 'bought' the Chagos a short time before, and then declared them independent of Mauritius. Both the UK and US were aware they risked falling foul of various UN resolutions and principles, and across many administrations have continued diplomatic manoeverings to obscure and frustrate any claims or other fuss.


It is striking that the numbers involved in both Falklands and Diego Garcia cases are rather similar. Perhaps the biggest difference is simply that the Chagossians were poor and black.